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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Setting the Stage

Imagine for a moment that an American police officer is on duty, patrolling
a neighborhood as he has done many times before. As he rounds a corner, he
takes notice of someone casually walking down the street, not engaging in any
illegal or suspicious behavior. Although seemingly innocuous, however, the
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pedestrian does match the description of a suspect in a recent armed robbery that
took place nearby. The officer, believing he may have spotted this suspect, pulls
over and stops the pedestrian. After speaking with him for a few minutes, the
officer reaches for his belt and retrieves a smartphone. He asks the pedestrian if
he would consent to having his picture taken, in a sense. The pedestrian, either
knowing he has nothing to hide or not wanting to arouse suspicion, agrees, and
the officer captures the image-except the image he has captured is not an
ordinary photograph. It is a high-resolution image of the pedestrian's eye. The
smartphone, in a matter of seconds, analyzes and processes the image, compares
the pedestrian's identity to an online database of previously captured images, and
returns the results to the officer.
Now, depending upon your point of view-and perhaps also on the result of
the hypothetical encounter (whether the pedestrian is in fact the robbery suspect
the officer is seeking)-this interaction between the police officer and the
pedestrian involves either a fantastic new tool for law enforcement, which will
help to keep our streets safer from criminals by denying them the ability to
present false identification and escape capture, or an unnerving Orwellian device
that facilitates intrusion into one's constitutionally protected right to privacy,
only an incremental step removed from the "big brother" state imagined in
fiction.1 However, the interaction described above is not a chapter from George
Orwell's 1984 or a scene from Minority Report.2 And, despite any discomfort or
misgivings one may have about the hypothetical scenario, 3 the device the officer
used to confirm or refute the pedestrian's involvement in the recent robbery is
currently on the market,4 and is being increasingly utilized by police departments
across the country, along with a number of other users.5 Personal beliefs aside,
however, the legal legitimacy of this technology ultimately depends on whether
the officer's conduct infringed on the pedestrian's Fourth Amendment rights
against illegal search and seizure.
When the House of Representatives adopted the Fourth Amendment among
the Bill of Rights in 1789,6 it surely did not envision the scenario described
above, at least not in that form exactly. The Fourth Amendment was developed
and adopted primarily to prevent the use of general warrants and writs of
assistance, which were prevalent in pre-revolutionary America, and which the

1.

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).

2.
MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox et al. 2002). This film was adapted from an
earlier short story. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in FANTASTIC UNIVERSE, Jan. 1956, at
4 (Leo Margulies ed., King-Size Publications, Inc.).
3. See, e.g., Tovia Smith, New Police Scanner Raises 'Facial Profiling' Concerns, NPR
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/11/138769662/new-police-scanner-raises-facialprofiling-concerns.
4. Products & Services, BI 2TEcHNOLOGIES, http://www.bi2technologies.com/products (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
5. See infra Part Il.B.
6. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1789), available at http://memory.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/r?arnmem/hlaw:@ field(DOCID+ @lit(hjOO 1139)).
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founders wanted to ensure did not emerge in the newly formed country. 7 While
the founders may not have imagined the technology used in modem society
when they drafted the Fourth Amendment, the language they ultimately adopted
is broad enough to cover its use. Although some have described the Fourth
Amendment as a "mass of contradictions and obscurities, ' 8 its broad language
has allowed the protections it provides to adapt as necessary to the world in
which it operates-to expand and contract as seen fit by the United States
its reach new technologies and societal
Supreme Court, 9 and to bring within
10
time.
over
develop
they
as
norms
B. Roadmap

This Note began by establishing a hypothetical scenario upon which the
subsequent analysis will be based. The next Part provides basic background
information regarding iris scanning in general and MORIS (the new technology
described above) in particular. A brief exploration of the influence of
contemporary social mores on the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence follows the background information in an attempt to discover
whether current cultural views of technology and its effect on privacy influence
the Court's treatment of mobile iris scanners. Part Imof this Note consists of a
Fourth Amendment analysis of the constitutionality of MORIS based upon the
Supreme Court's prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Following the federal
analysis, this Part inquires whether the constitution of the State of South
Carolina offers any additional protection for the pedestrian in our hypothetical.
Finally, this Note concludes by discussing concerns raised by the use of mobile
iris scanners and offers suggestions to ameliorate-or eliminate-these
concerns.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Iris Scanning Generally

In order to undertake an analysis of the constitutionality of mobile iris
scanning, it is important to first understand the science and fundamentals of how
iris scanning and recognition works. This begins with a brief lesson in biology.

7.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886). See generally THOMAS
N. MCINNIs, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 15-20 (2009).
8.
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468
(1985); see also MCINNIS, supra note 7, at 5 ("[C]ourts have struggled to come up with a clear
understanding of what constitutes a violation of the amendment.").
9.
MCINNIS, supra note 7, at 43.
10. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (analyzing the use of a thermal
scanner under the Fourth Amendment).
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The iris is a muscle located in the front of the eye, surrounding the pupil. 1' The
function of the iris is to change the size of the pupil in order to regulate the
amount of light that enters the eye. Formed before birth, one's iris is believed to
be unique from all others. 12
Iris scans are performed b3 capturing a high-resolution image of the eye
using near-infrared (NIR) light. NIR light is used to illuminate the iris without
causing discomfort to the subject.1 4 Once the image is captured it must be
processed in a few different ways. First, the iris is isolated from the rest of the
image using landmark features. 15 Isolation is performed so that only the iris, and
not the eyelashes or eyelid, is processed for identification.16 Once isolation is
complete, complex mathematical algorithms are performed that encode the
visual image of the iris into a digital array, similar to DNA sequencing gel or a
complex barcode. 17 It is this "map" of the iris that is then compared to other
"maps" saved in a database, either to seek out a match or to compare against a
particular entry to confirm or refute an individual's purported identity. 18
It must be noted at the outset that iris scanning is entirely different from
retinal scanning. 19 While iris scanning captures an image of the external, front
portion of the eye, retinal scanning captures an image of the retina, which is
located at the back, inside the eye. 20 Retinal scanning also incorporates NIR
light to illuminate the eye, but uses the unique pattern of blood vessels located
on the retina, instead of the color patterns of the iris, to identify a subject. 21
B.

CurrentUses

Iris scanning, while still a relatively new form of identification when
compared to other methods such as fingerprinting, 22 is beginning to gain traction

11.

(2006),

SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, IRIS RECOGNITION 1, fig.1

available at

http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/IrisRec.pdf

[hereinafter

NSTC

REPORT].

12. Id.
13. See John Daugman, How Iris Recognition Works, 14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS
& SYS. FOR VIDEO TECH. 21, 21-22 (2004), available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-jgdlOO0/
csvt.pdf.
14. NSTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 2; see Daugman, supra note 13, at 22.
15. NSTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 3; Daugman, supra note 13, at 22-23.
18. See NSTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 3 (citing John Daugman, Mathematical Explanation
of Iris Recognition, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uklusers/jgdlOOO/math.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012)).
19. See id. at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Stephanie Watson, How Fingerprinting Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.how
stuffworks.com/fmgerprinting3.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). Fingerprints were used in lieu of
signatures in 1858 by Sir William Herschel, Chief Magistrate of the Hooghly district in Jungipoor,
India. The first systemic use in the United States was by New York State prisons in 1903. Id.
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23

via a number of different uses throughout society. For example, in 2005, the
John F. Kennedy Airport in New York implemented a pilot program that utilized
iris scanners in order to allow preregistered passengers to circumvent the
standard customs procedures and to quickly proceed through the airport.24 In
2011, the TSA announced plans to implement a nearly identical program to
expedite security checks, although the scope of the TSA effort is not yet clear. 25
The New York Police Department already scans the irises of all arrestees to track
them through the court system and prevent their escape.26 Additionally, the
Justice Department is partnering with the National Sherriff's Association to
implement similar programs in jails across the country in an effort to prevent
escapes. 27 In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security began testing the
effectiveness of using iris scanners at a border patrol station to track illegal
immigrants, 28 and the United States military has used iris scanners in Iraq and
Afghanistan to build a database of almost four million residents. 29 Despite its
relatively limited use at present, 30 iris scanning technology is gaining acceptance
in an increasing number of settings, and is poised to spread considerably over the
next few years.
C. MORIS
MORIS, or Mobile Offender Recognition and Identification System, is the
technology at the focus of this Note.
MORIS is manufactured by
31 The device is a 12-ounce attachment 32 to the now ubiquitous
BI2Technologies.
33
iPhone, and allows an officer in the field to perform not only an iris scan, as

23. The examples in this Part illustrate the current uses of iris scanning technology generally,
and do not represent the specific phone-based system that is the focus of this Note.
24. Ian Bishop, Eye Flight: Iris Scan for JFK Passengers, N.Y. POST (Jan. 14, 2005, 12:00
AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/eye-flightiris scanfor_.jfk-passengers-SHsHDP5nqtySchjk
HsTlaM.
25. See Adam Clark Estes, Coming to an Airport Near You: Iris Scanners, THE ATL. WIRE
(June 7, 2011), http:llwww.theatlanticwire.comltechnology/201106/coming-airport-near-you-iris-

scanners/38595.
26. Ray Rivera & Al Baker, New York City Police Photograph Irises of Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/nyregion/16retinas.html.
27. See Melanie S. Welte, Iris Scans May Prevent Mistaken Release of Inmates, USA TODAY
(Feb. 27, 2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.usatoday.comlnews/topstories/2010-02-27-2493914959x.htm.
28. Thomas Frank, Homeland Security to Test Iris Scanners, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2010,
10:37 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillancel20l0-09-13-lAirisl3STN.htm.
29. See Thom Shanker, To Track Militants, U.S. Has System That Never Forgets a Face,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html.
30. See Welte, supra note 27.
31. See Products & Services, supra note 4.
32. Smith, supra note 3.
33. See Apple Reports First Quarter Results, APPLE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.apple.
com/pr/library/2012/01/24Apple-Reports-First-Quarter-Results.htm
(reporting that over thirtyseven million units were sold in the first quarter of fiscal year 2012 alone).
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described in the hypothetical, but also facial recognition and fingerprint
comparisons, 34 all remotely with no additional equipment required.3 5
BI 2 Technologies' marketing brochure for MORIS claims that the device is "ideal
for identifying" sex offenders, illegal immigrants, gang members, individuals
with outstanding warrants, parolees, and probationers.36 It is available only to
government agencies and officials, 37 and as of mid-2011, roughly forty law
38
enforcement agencies had ordered approximately one thousand units.
Currently, BI 2 has official endorsements for its line of products from the
39
National Association of Triads (NATI) and the National Sheriff's Association.
III. SOCIETY AS A FOURTH AMENDMENT "BAROMETER"

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once referred to the law as a "magic mirror,"
"wherein.. . we see reflected, not only our own lives, but the lives of all men
that have been.' 4° Other Justices have repeated the sentiment that the law is an
expression of our values as a society, specifically in reference to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, 4' and it is generally understood that the Court's
determination of "reasonableness" as it relates to the Fourth Amendment is
42
shaped in large part by cultural norms. If this premise is true, and the Court
does consider societal views in its Fourth Amendment analysis, then it may be

34. Smith, supra note 3. This Note focuses solely on the device's iris scanning and
recognition functions.
35. See Products & Services, supra note 4.
36. Mobile, Wireless and Hand Held Offender Recognition and Information System,
BI 2TECHNOLOGIES,
http://www.bi2technologies.com/sites/default/files/documents/MORIS-Broch
ure.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
37. Brian Heaton, Iris and Facial Scan Smartphone Nears Mass Release, GOVERNMENT
TECHNOLOGY (July 21, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Iris-Facial-Scan-SmartphoneNears-Mass-Release.html. As the database against which the iris is compared grows in size, the
possibility of false matches will surely grow as well. Whether or not this increase will be
significant remains to be seen.
38. See Smart phone face scan tech a privacy breach?, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2011, 10:32
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/07/15/earlyshow/leisure/gamesgadgetsgizmos/main200
79772.shtml.
39. Endorsements, BIMIECHNOLOGIES, http://www.bi2technologies.com (last visited Apr. 4,
2012).
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Law, Address Before the Suffolk Bar Association Dinner
(Feb. 5, 1885), reprinted in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 21
(photo. reprint 1979) (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press,
1962).
41. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[1]t
is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect.").
42. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(explaining that "dramatic technological change" may change popular attitudes toward privacy
expectations); Note, The Fourth Amendment's Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (2007)
("[I]t is clear that social convention has become the defining ideal of the Fourth Amendment-the
source of authority that gives reasonableness its shape."). For the relevance of reasonableness in
Fourth Amendment law, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
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instructive to consider the current relationship our culture has with privacy rights

as they relate to technology in general, and to iris scanners in particular.
"technocentric"-from our
Our daily lives are becoming increasingly
44
43
methods of communication with one another to how we encounter the news,
and nearly everything in between. We are undoubtedly becoming more
dependent on technology to accomplish almost every task. Along with this
increasing dependence on technology comes an increase in the sharing of
personal information,45 either with people we know (through social media,
perhaps), or with third party entities that assist us in whatever task we are trying
to accomplish. As we become more willing to use technology that requires the
sharing of information, our expectations of privacy in this information are
consequently reduced. 46 It follows, then, given the premise above, that the
protection of the Fourth Amendment is similarly reduced in scope.47
If the Fourth Amendment protections are constantly being eroded by the
ubiquity of technology and information sharing in our daily lives, then one
would expect the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to reflect
this trend. However, two recent cases refute this contention. In Kyllo v. United
States,48 the Court determined that the use of a thermal scanner on one's home,
49
without a warrant, constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 50
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in United States v. Jones
explicitly addressed the increasing dependence upon technology as it relates to
invasions of privacy and stated that "it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
' t Although these cases seem
to third
parties.'remains
information
disclosedabove,
premise outlined
it likely
true, and yet, while the
to
counter thevoluntarily

43. See, e.g., In U.S., SMS Text Messaging Tops Mobile Phone Calling, NIELSENWIRE (Sept.
22, 2008), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/0nline- mobile/in-us-text-messaging-tops-mobilephone-calling (analyzing the increase in the use of SMS text messaging).
44. See, e.g., Internet Overtakes Newspapers as News Outlet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Dec. 23, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1066/internet-overtakes-newspapers-as-news-outlet
(reporting that the internet has surpassed all other media except television as an outlet for national
and international news).
45. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (noting that in today's digital age, "people reveal a great deal
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks"); Orin
S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 828 (2004) ("New technologies more commonly expose
information that in the past would have remained hidden, resulting in meager Fourth Amendment
protection in new technologies.").
46. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (recognizing the "power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy"); Kerr, supra note 45, at 828; Joshua S. Levy,
Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH.
499,501,503 (2011).
47. See Levy, supra note 46, at 504.
48. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
49. Id. at 40.
50. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
51. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection is slowly narrowing with societal
expectations, the Court is reluctant to allow such a change to occur too quickly
or without adequate consideration. 52 Consequently, it would seem that, iven the
limited exposure that iris scanners have attained thus far in society and the
natural suspicion that their use arouses in most people, 54 the technology may be
circumscribed by our reasonable expectation, or lack thereof, of its adoption by
law enforcement for mobile identification.
However, a consideration of the evolution of societal views on privacy and
technology, while relevant to a certain extent, may prove not to be determinative
in predicting a Supreme Court outcome, and more weight must ultimately be
given to the Court's precedent in attempting to accurately predict how the Court
will answer the constitutional question that our hypothetical poses.55
IV. CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

A.

When Does the FourthAmendment Apply?

The Fourth Amendment states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. '' 56 Therefore, in order for our hypothetical
encounter to be within the reach of the amendment, it must first be determined
that either a "search" or a "seizure," as defined by the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, has taken place. However, the inquiry does not end at the mere
conclusion that a search or seizure has occurred, for "what the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and

52. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) ("The judiciary risks error by
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear.").
53. See Welte, supra note 27.
54. See Zach Howard, Police to begin iPhone iris scans amid privacy concerns, REUTERS
(July 20, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/us-crime-identification-irisidUSTRE76J4A120110720.
55. One could argue that attempting to predict the Supreme Court's decision in a future
hypothetical Fourth Amendment case is an effort in futility given the state of its jurisprudence in the
area. See The Fourth Amendment's Third Way, supra note 42, at 1627 (quoting Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Your Place or Mine? Privacy of Presence Under the Fourth Amendment, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 253,
253 (1999); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 758
(1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
349 (1974)) (noting the obscurity of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). In addition, attempting to
predict the outcome of any Supreme Court case can be described as difficult, at best. See Theodore
W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and PoliticalScience Approaches
to PredictingSupreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1150, 1152 (2004) (stating that
legal experts accurately predict Supreme Court case outcomes only 59.1% of the time).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the states, and therefore, against our hypothetical police officer.
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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seizures." 57 Therefore, only if it is determined that a search or seizure was
unreasonable will the protections of the Constitution take effect.
B. What Is a "Seizure" and When Is It Justified?

What, then, constitutes a seizure for the purposes of our constitutional
analysis? It must be noted that there are two types of seizure recognized by the
Supreme Court as constitutionally distinct-that of a person and that of
property.

For purposes of this Note, the concern is only with seizure of a

person, and seizure of property will not be discussed. 59 Seizure of a person
occurs when a law enforcement officer "restrains [an individual's] freedom to
walk away. '"6 However, a seizure does not occur merely by the officer
approaching the individual and asking questions or engaging him in
conversation, even if the officer identifies himself as such 62 or asks the
individual for identification. 63 In order for a seizure to occur, there must either
be an application of physical force by the officer or a showing of authority to
which the individual yields, 64 such that a reasonable person in
65 the individual's
position would not believe that he is free to end the interaction.
Having established what constitutes a seizure, one must also consider the
circumstances in which a seizure is and is not reasonable for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. The landmark case of Terry v. Ohio66 outlines the Supreme
Court's current framework for evaluating the reasonableness of an impromptu
stop by a police officer. 67 In Terry, the Court stated that there is no black-letter
test for determining reasonableness, but that a balancing must be done of the
need to search or seize against the invasion to the individual which the search or

57. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
58. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
59. "A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984).
60. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
61. See id. at 19 n.16; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983).
62. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980)).
63. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004); but see Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (stating that a seizure occurred when police stopped the defendant and asked
for identification). The legal distinction between these two cases seems to be that, in Brown, the
seizure was not a result of the police officers merely asking the defendant for identification. See
Brown, 443 U.S. at 49. The defendant asserted that the officers had no right to stop him and that the
officers frisked him. Id. It would seem that the seizure was established by the fact that the officers
insisted upon his cooperation and refused to allow him to walk away.
64. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16);
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
65. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628);
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
66. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
67. Id. at 19-20. Courts often refer to this type of encounter as a "Terry stop." See, e.g.,
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185.
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seizure requires. 68 In determining whether a seizure is reasonable, the "officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 69 The
officer's "reasonable suspicion ' 70 that the individual is engaging, or has recently
engaged in criminal activity, must be founded upon more than a mere hunch,
and must be based upon facts 72
that would justify to a reasonable person "that the
action taken was appropriate.,
Later opinions have supported and clarified the requirements for a justifiable
Terry stop, stating that courts should take into account the "totality of the
circumstances" when determining reasonableness. 73 In addition, the level of
suspicion required is less than that needed to establish probable cause. 74 While
the threshold level of justifiable suspicion is relatively low, the scope of any
detention, once initiated, must be
75 limited to only that which is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.

C. What Is a "Search" and When Is It Justified?

In early decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
stated that for a search to occur, there must be either a physical search of a
person (i.e., a frisk orpat-down) or a physical invasion into a private area, such
as a home or office.
However, this line of reasoning was overruled in the
landmark case Katz v. United States.77 In Katz, the Court declared that FBI

68. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)); see
also Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51 ("Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a
weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.").
69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
70. Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This phrase appears only in Justice Douglas's dissent
in Terry, but has gained widespread acceptance and use in subsequent cases and by the legal
community at large. See, e.g., Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185 (using the term "reasonable suspicion" in
connection with Terry).
71. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
72. Id. at 21-22. See also, e.g., Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 (holding that the contention the
suspect "looked suspicious," without any supporting facts, was insufficient to meet the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 332 (1990); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981).
74. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
75. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) ('The scope of the detention must be
carefully tailored to its underlying justification."). Moreover, the stop must be limited in duration,
while the investigative methods employed need not be the least intrusive means available. See
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11.
76. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942), overruled in part by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928),
overruledin part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
77. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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agents violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when they attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public phone booth
in order to eavesdrop on the defendant's phone calls.7 8 The Court stated that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," 79 and that Fourth
Amendment protection is not coterminous with a physical intrusion into an
enclosure.80 Expounding on this idea, the Court added a subjective element to
the notion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment is willing to protect and stated:
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
Justice Harlan's oft cited concurrence provided a
constitutionally protected.
two-part test that contains both a subjective and an objective element-in order
to gain constitutional protection, a person must first "exhibit[] an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy,', 82 and the expectation must be one that
society is "pre pared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"83 Twelve years later, in Smith
v. Maryland,°the Supreme Court slightly modified the Katz test, stating that
there are certain situations in which, due to the subjective expectations of an
individual being influenced by notions antithetical to the Fourth Amendment, the
subjective prong of Justice Harlan's test can "play no meaningful role.' 8 5 In
86
these situations, the Court stated that "a normative inquiry would be proper.
Thus, the subjective element of the Katz test was relegated to a lesser
significance than the objective element, at least in certain situations. Later, in
United States v. Jacobsen,87 the Court stated simply that "[a] 'search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
This appears to have eliminated the subjective component of the
infringed.
Katz test in all circumstances, replacing it with the normative inquiry proposed
by Smith.
Now that a basic, albeit nebulous, definition of search has been established,
when is a search-an invasion of one's reasonable expectation of privacyconstitutionally permissible? Again, our inquiry is limited to our hypothetical
scenario, and as such, the probable cause requirement of the Warrant Clause of
89
The Court in Katz reiterated the
the Fourth Amendment is not applicable.

78. Id. at 359.
79. Id. at 351.
80. Id.at 353.
81. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
85. Id. at 740 n.5.
86. Id.
87. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
88. Id. at 113.
89. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police
conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
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long-standing rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a
limited number of exceptions. 9° Those exceptions include searches incident to a
valid arrest, searches justified by exigent circumstances, 91 consent
searches, and
a number of others not applicable to our hypothetical encounter. 92
V.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, APPLIED TO OUR HYPOTHETICAL

A. Is There a Seizure?

As discussed above, whether a seizure occurs depends upon whether there is
an application of physical force, or a show of authority, to which the pedestrian
yields, and whether a reasonable person in the same situation would believe that
he is free to walk away from the police officer. 93 Therefore, whether a seizure
occurred in our hypothetical depends a great deal on the behavior of the police
officer. If the officer were at any point to physically restrain the pedestrian or
state to him that 94he is not free to leave (and the pedestrian complies), then a
seizure did occur.
B. Is the Seizure Reasonable?

The inquiry then turns to whether the seizure is reasonable, and therefore
constitutional, under the circumstances. Recall that the reason the officer
stopped the pedestrian is because the pedestrian matched the description of the
suspect in a robbery that occurred near the hypothetical Terry stop. In Hayes v.
95 the Court stated
Florida,
in dicta that the Fourth Amendment would permit a
seizure for the purposes of fingerprinting a suspect in the field if there was a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a crime, and the officer had a
reasonable belief that fingerprinting would establish or negate the suspect's
involvement in the crime. 96

The Court qualified this permission, however,

' 97
stating that the fingerprinting process must be "carried out with dispatch.

beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the
warrant procedure.").
90. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
91. See Investigations and Police Practices, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 39, 40
(2008). "Exigent circumstances exist when there is probable cause for a search or seizure and the
evidence sought is in imminent danger of destruction, the safety of law enforcement officers or the
general public is threatened, the police are in 'hot pursuit' of a suspect, or a suspect is likely to flee
before the officer can obtain a warrant." Id. at 72-74.
92. Id. at 40.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
94. See supra text accompanying note 64.
95. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
96. Id. at 817.
97. Id.
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Therefore, if fingerprinting in the field is permissible, it would seem to follow
that mobile iris scanning would also be allowed, subject to the same conditions.
In our hypothetical, the police officer should be able to establish reasonable
suspicion that the suspect recently engaged in a crime since the pedestrian
matches the description of the robbery suspect. The officer is working off of
more than just a hunch, and has particularized facts that should easily justify
reasonable suspicion. Following the guidelines laid out in Hayes, however, the
officer must also have a reasonable belief that scanning the pedestrian's iris
would establish or negate his involvement in the robbery, and the iris scan must
be carried out expeditiously. 98 The extent to which the iris scan would establish
or negate the pedestrian's involvement in the robbery will depend primarily upon
the breadth of the database against which the iris scan is compared. It can be
reasonably assumed that, since iris scanning is a much newer technology than
fingerprinting, the database of irises from past offenders will be smaller than the
database of fingerprints that the police department will have on hand. However,
it seems logical that police would not use the mobile iris scanners unless they
offered an appreciable benefit, 99 and thus it can also be assumed that the
likelihood of a suspect being identified in the database is not insignificant.
Additionally, when considering the balancing test outlined in Terry," it
appears that a mobile iris scan would be more constitutionally permissible than
mobile fingerprinting. For example, the need to search or seize is the same
regardless of what methods of identification are employed, and the invasion of a
suspect's rights is arguably less with a mobile iris scan than with
fingerprinting-after all, fingerprinting involves physical contact and perhaps
the use of ink that would have to be removed from one's skin, while an iris scan
using MORIS requires no more of an invasion than having one's picture taken.
Given the above reasoning, one would be tempted to assume that the
constitutionality of mobile iris scanners is a foregone conclusion. However,
Justice Brennan's dissent in Hayes calls into question the permissibility of onsite fingerprinting.101 Besides believing that the majority's treatment of the issue
was unnecessary,10 2 Justice Brennan stated that the constitutionality of on-site
fingerprinting would need to be evaluated under the standards laid out by Terry,
and that, unlike the patdown in Terry, the privacy intrusion that on-site
fingerprinting entails is not justifiable as necessary to protect the safety of the
police officer.' 0 3 The Hayes majority, though, did not agree that police safety is

98. See id.
99. In fact, law enforcement officers use iris scanners as part of the booking, detention, and
release process, so a database of past offenders' iris scans may be nearly as useful as a
corresponding fingerprint database. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
100. See supra text accompanying note 68.
101. See Hayes, 470 U.S. t 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 820. Justice Brennan described the Court's discussion of on-site fingerprinting as
"an advisory opinion concerning... a police practice that.., has never been attempted," and stated
that the issue was not properly before the Court. Id.
103. Id. at 819.
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the paramount requirement justifying on-site fingerprinting, and stated that
reasonable suspicion of complicity in a t recent
or ongoing crime is all that is
4
needed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 1
In addition to the uncertainty introduced by Justice Brennan's dissent, there
is a legally significant difference between fingerprinting and iris scanning that
has yet to be explored by the courts-the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy in one's iris as compared to one's fingerprints.10 5
C. Is There a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Irises?
Katz states that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 1°6 Under this reasoning, the Supreme
Court has ruled that one's face, 1 7 voice, 08 and handwriting t°9 are all physical
characteristics constantly exposed to the public that do not warrant the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court has also ruled that taking the
scrapings from underneath a suspect's fingernails does constitute a search, and is
therefore under the purview of the Fourth Amendment."10 In that case, the
Court, quoting Dionisio and Terry, stated that the search went beyond mere
physical characteristics that are constantly exposed to the public and constituted
a severe intrusion upon the suspect's personal security."' In another case, the
Court ruled that an employer's use of a breathalyzer test to detect alcohol in
employees also constituted a search.
The Court reasoned that the test
implicated concerns about bodily integrity, similar to those raised by a blood
test, and should be protected by the Fourth Amendment. 113 In Schmerber v.
California,' 4 the Court ruled that taking a blood sample from an alleged drunk
driver, while the driver received treatment at a hospital for injuries sustained in
an accident, was also a search. 1 5 The Court drew a distinction between searches
"involving intrusions beyond the body's surface," and those of a less invasive
nature, declaring that a valid arrest, which ordinarily
allows the latter class of
16
searches, does not necessarily justify the former.'

104. Id.at 817 (majority opinion).
105. The Supreme Court has been somewhat ambiguous on whether fingerprinting constitutes
a search. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1, 8 n.39 (2006) (quoting Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814, 817; Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,724, 727,730 (1969)).
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
107. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
108. Id.
109. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973).
110. See Cupp, 412 U.S. at 294.
111. Id.
112. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
113. Id.
114. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
115. Id. at 758, 767.
116. See id. at 769.
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Under the reasoning of this jurisprudence, it would appear that arguing for a
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's irises may be an uphill battle. The
Court consistently considers physical characteristics on the surface of one's body
to be less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection than internal
characteristics and processes, and since the iris lies on the surface of the body the
Court may well consider it to be constantly exposed to the public.
However, unlike one's face or voice, the unique patterns of the iris are not
easily ascertainable by the general public. In fact, the MORIS system requires a
high-resolution camera, used within roughly six inches of a subject's face, to
obtain the necessary image for comparison. 117 In other words, while one's eyes
may generally be in view of the public, the data contained in one's irises are,
unlike voice or facial characteristics, not necessarily "exposed" to the world. In
order to capture and make use of the data in an individual's iris, a law
enforcement officer needs the aid of technology.
1.

Enhanced Senses

The Supreme Court has had a number of occasions to consider the Fourth
Amendment implications of technologies that enhance one's vision used to
conduct a search. In Lee v. United States,118 the Court stated that the use of
visual magnifiers, including bifocals, field glasses, or telescopes, is not forbidden
12 °
119
Later, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
by the Fourth Amendment.

the Court ruled that the use of an aerial mapping camera mounted to the floor of
an airplane, to take high-resolution images of a chemical plant, did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 121 The Court stated in Dow Chemical that "[t]he mere
fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does
not give rise to constitutional problems." 122
However, most recently in Kyllo v. United States, the Court declared that
the warrantless use of thermal scanners by police to detect heat emanating from
the walls of a residential home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment." In
both Kyllo and Dow, the Court made special note of the location that was the
subject of the surveillance. 25 In Dow, the Court pointed out that the area
photographed was not one where privacy expectations are traditionally

117. See Emily Steel, How a New Police Tool for Face Recognition Works, WALL ST. J.
DIGITS BLOG (July 13, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/how-a-new-policetool-for-face-recognition-works/.
118. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
119. Id. at 754.
120. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
121. Id. at 238.
122. Id.
123. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
124. Id. at 40.
125. See id. at 34; Dow, 476 U.S. at 237.
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heightened, such as one's home and the surrounding curtilage. 26 Additionally,
the chemical plant had taken no precautions to ensure that the area could not be
aerially photographed. 27 In Kyllo, the Court used language from Dow and
emphasized the fact that the police were using the thermal scanner to obtain
information relating to the interior of a home, which it referred to as the
"prototypical ...area of protected privacy. ' 12s These cases show that the Court,
while generally receptive to sense-enhancing technology in the furtherance of
searches, still returns to Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy standard,
drawing a clear line of demarcation between what is reasonable
in private areas
129
as opposed to public (or as in Dow, non-private) places.
In addition to the location aspect, the Court also focuses on the general
availability of the technologies used in the search. In Dow, the Court noted that
"surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology,
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."' 130 The Dow Court found
that the camera used, while perhaps prohibitively expensive for the average
consumer,13 1 was commonly used in mapmaking and did not take advantage of
32
any unique technology that was not available to the general public.1
Conversely, in Kyllo, the Court noted that the thermal imaging technology used
by the police was not in general public use.133 The Court addressed this issue
head on, citing precedent supporting the inclusion of general availability as a
factor in determining reasonableness
134 of privacy expectations, and it explicitly
refused to "reexamine that factor."
The Court's precedent regarding the use of technology to enhance human
senses for the purposes of a search suggest that the use of mobile iris scanners, as
described in our hypothetical, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.
As the Court generally seems to permit the use of sense-enhancing technology so
long as the traditional reasonable expectation of privacy is not significantly
violated, the fact that an officer's sense of sight is enhanced by MORIS, in and
of itself, does not appear to create a constitutional problem. In addition, the iris
scans do not require the intrusion into areas of traditionally heightened privacy

126. Dow, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4.
127. See id.
128. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
129. One commentator noted that the Court's tolerance of sense-enhancing technologies in
public places "has left any reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place completely
eviscerated."
Alexander T. Nguyen, Here's Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition
Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 10 (2002).
130. Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
131. The trial court noted that the cost of the camera was in excess of $22,000. See id. at 242
n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 n.2
(E.D. Mich. 1982)).
132. Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
133. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
134. Id. at 39 n.6.
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expectations, as was the case in Kyllo. In our hypothetical, the scan is performed
on a public street, arguably a location which offers the least expectation of
privacy. Furthermore, the technology used to perform the scan is commonly
available. MORIS attaches to a standard iPhone and uses the built-in camera to
capture the image that is processed for identity comparison. 3 5 Currenfly, the
iPhone is one of the most used devices around the world for photography, and
therefore, the Court is unlikely to determine that the use of MORIS is an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy based solely on the technology used.
2.

Abandonment

However, another distinction can be made between fingerprints and the
patterns of irises, which the Court has recognized in other contexts-the fact that
fingerprints can be left behind, or "abandoned," on objects touched by an
individual, whereas the patterns of one's iris are never abandoned-that is,
unless captured by a device such as MORIS. The Court drew this critical
distinction as it relates to trash in California v. Greenwood,137 stating that once
the defendants placed their trash bags on the curb in front of their home (i.e., a
public place), they could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
trash.
At least one state supreme court applied this reasoning to DNA left on
abandoned objects, 139 and commentators have expressed concerns that the
Supreme Court may follow suit. 14 Whether or not this distinction is one that
would give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's irises, however, is
unclear, and remains an open question until addressed by the Court.
3.

The Plain View Doctrine

In addition to the cases presented above, the Court has also developed the
"plain view" doctrine as an exception to the general rule that warrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable.14 The plain view doctrine states that
if an object is in plain view-meaning that it can be observed from a legal

135. Chloe Albanesius, Police Depts Deploying iPhone-Based Iris, Face Scanning Tech,
PCMAG.COM (July 14, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2388499,00.
asp#fbid=XGMXe8glOZ5.
136. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, IPhone 4 Becoming Most Popular 'Camera' on Flickr, N.Y.
TIMES BITS (Apr. 18, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.comV2011/04/18lphone-4becoming-most-popular-camera-on-flickr (listing the most used cameras on the popular photo
sharing website Flickr).
137. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
138. Id. at 40.
139. See State v. Wickline, 440 N.W.2d 249, 252-53 (Neb. 1989) disapproved of by State v.
Sanders, 455 N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1990).
140. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REv. 857, 865 & nn.43-46 (2006) (discussing the many genetic
traces that humans unknowingly leave behind).
141. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
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vantage point-then "neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any
invasion of privacy." 142 In our hypothetical, the irises of the pedestrian are in
plain view of the police officer. Consequently, the Court could apply this
43
doctrine and hold that viewing (and subsequently capturing in a photograph)
the pedestrian's eyes was not a search, and thus, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Even if the pedestrian were wearing sunglasses, thereby hiding his
irises from plain view, courts are in general agreement that the officer could
instruct him to remove the glasses without violating the pedestrian's Fourth
Amendment rights. 44 However, the plain view doctrine has, thus far, been
applied only to the seizure of objects whose incriminating character is
immediately apparent, 45 and has not been expanded to include a person's
physical characteristics.
VI. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution also includes, in
addition to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, a right against "unreasonable invasions of privacy."' 146 This section
was amended from its original form in 1967, when the relevant clause was added
in order to "take care of the invasion of privacy through modem electronic
devices."' 147 The South Carolina Supreme Court has subsequently interpreted
this clause to offer a higher level of privacy protection than that offered by the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 8 However, to date, the court has

142. Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765,
771 (1983)).
143. In United States v. Taketa, the Ninth Circuit held that videotaping in public places does
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated that "the
police may record what they normally may view with the naked eye." Id. Considering that a video
recording is essentially many pictures taken in succession, this reasoning presumptively applies to
photographs as well.
144. See, e.g., State v. Shearer, 30 P.3d 995, 1000 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]aking minimal
steps to temporarily conceal a facial characteristic that is ordinarily and frequently exposed to the
public is, in our view, insufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy."); People v. Weekly,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 326 (Ct. App. 1995) ("wearing sunglasses [is not] sufficient by itself to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy").
145. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 129 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466
(1971)).
146. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (amended 1967). The full text of this section states: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, the person or thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained." Id.
147. COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1895),

MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETING 6 (Sept. 15, 1967).
148. See State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 113, 651 S.E.2d 314, 317 (2007) (citing State v.
Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 645, 541 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2001)); State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 322, 649
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not yet vindicated a defendant's privacy rights solely under the state constitution
as related to search and seizure, 49 nor has it offered much in the form of
commentary to establish the extent of the higher level of protection that the
language offers. Therefore, while the amendment to section 10 seems perfectly

suited to establish a heightened expectation of privacy as it relates to systems
like MORIS, an assertion that the South Carolina Supreme Court would take the
opportunity to acknowledge such a right would only be speculative at this point.
VII. CONCERNS
Having made the case that the use of MORIS would not likely be considered
by the Supreme Court to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, this Part of the
Note will address potential concerns that systems such as MORIS raise in a realworld environment.

One major concern regarding the widespread use of an iris scanning system
is that it could be used to capture people's iris data without their knowledge or
consent. MORIS, according to BI President and CEO Sean Mullin, apparently
requires the cooperation of its subject in order to capture a useable image.

However, while MORIS currently requires the device to be relatively close to the
subject in order to obtain a useable image,151 even newer cameras allow for an
image to be taken up to six feet away, 152 and as technology progresses, so too

will the range of the iris scanners.
A related concern that privacy advocates may have with MORIS is the
potential of capturing iris information from citizens who ultimately have no
criminal record and are of no real interest to police. The makers of MORIS
claim that a user's iris information is deleted immediately if no match is found in

S.E.2d 479, 483 (2007) (citing S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (amended 1967)); Forrester,343 S.C. at
645, 541 S.E.2d at 841.
149. See, e.g., Houey, 375 S.C. at 113, 651 S.E.2d at 317 (following analysis under the U.S.
Constitution, and finding no violation of rights, the court determined that testing of bodily fluids of
offender for disease was "not overly intrusive or so unreasonable as to render the statute violative of
the South Carolina Constitution"); Weaver, 374 S.C. at 322, 649 S.E.2d at 483 (holding that the
provision does not require a warrant before the search and seizure of an automobile located in the
backyard of a residence; the focus of the state constitution is "whether the invasion of privacy is
reasonable"); Forrester,343 S.C. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841 (holding that the state constitution's
privacy provision does not require police officers to inform citizens of their right to refuse
consensual searches). The court has stated, however, that section 10 does prohibit forced
medication solely to facilitate execution of a prisoner. Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 89, 437
S.E.2d 53, 61 (1993). In addition, it is contended that in State v. Brown, 389 S.C. 473, 698 S.E.2d
811 (Ct. App. 2010), the South Carolina Court of Appeals "may have taken the first step in defining
an unreasonable invasion of privacy." Jaclyn L. McAndrew, Who Has More Privacy?: State v.
Brown and Its Effect on South CarolinaCriminalDefendants, 62 S.C. L. REv. 671, 694-95 (2011).
150. See John Cox, Eyeball-Scanning iPhone Used by Cops to ID Suspects, CIO (July 21,
2011), httpJ/www.cio.com/article/686547/EyebaU__Scanning_ IPhone UsedBy-Cops-to__IDSuspects;
see also Howard, supra note 54.
151. See Steel, supra note 117; see also Cox, supra note 150.
152. Frank, supra note 28.
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the database; 153 however, without oversight by an independent organization,
there is no way to confirm this assertion. Additionally, there are no laws
currently in place to ensure that this policy is not changed sometime in the
future, t1 4 resulting in the
accumulation of private information to which the police
155
have no valid interest.
Another particularly relevant concern that can be raised concerning iris
scanning technology, along with any system of suspect identification, is the
accuracy of the technology used, and the potential error rate involved with use of
the system. According to John Daugman, who pioneered the iris mapping
algorithms embedded in MORIS's software, the theoretical false match rate
under real-world conditions is around 1 in 4 million.' 56 In addition,
BI 2Technologies has claimed the system has a "virtual zero error rate,"' 157 and
that "3.12 billion cross-matches [have been performed] without one false
match."' 158 In addition to the low theoretical error rate of the matching
algorithms, the MORIS system, upon finding a match to a subject's iris, will
return a picture of the purported match, allowing the officer to confirm or deny
the system's match to an even greater degree of certainty. 159 If the above claims
of accuracy are true and translate to actual error rates in the field, then MORIS
could prove to provide a relatively low risk of false matches.
Perhaps a more salient concern about the MORIS system lies not in its
matching capabilities, but in the method of data transmission that the system
employs. As MORIS is an attachment to a consumer smartphone, the system
uses existing cellular networks to transmit to, and receive data from, the central
database that it searches for a match. 16° As such, the data is vulnerable to
interception by hackers and identity thieves.161 In addition to intercepting the
signal to and from the phone, criminals
could
take advantage
of the iPhone's
•
•
•162
Another
operating system to hack into the phone itself and retrieve data.

153. See Smartphone face scan tech a privacy breach?, supra note 38.
154. See id.

155. That type of aggregation of information, known as data mining, is a strikingly common
practice among federal agencies. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-548,
DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 2 (noting that fifty-two

agencies reported a hundred and thirty-one operational and sixty-eight planned data mining efforts);
Kerr, supra note 45, at 829.
156. See Daugman, supra note 13, at 28.
157. RI Middleton, iPhonefor 'The Man': Face-RecognitionHardware Available, NBC BAY
AREA (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.nbcbayarea.comlnews/tech/iPhone-for-The-ManFace-Recognition-Hardware-Available-i 10965789.html.
158. See Heaton, supra note 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. See Smart phone face scan tech a privacy breach?, supra note 38.
160. See Heaton, supra note 37 (noting that BI 2, along with the National Sheriffs Association,
built and maintain the database used by MORIS).
161. See Kate Murphy, Build Up Your Phone's Defenses Against Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/technology/personaltech/protecting-a-cellphoneagainst-hackers.html?_r=-1.
162. See Ben Parr, iPhone Hack Exposed: The Key Facts, MASHABLE (July 30, 2009),
http://mashable.com/2009/07/30/iphone-hackL.
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potential vulnerability is the fact that the database to which the MORIS system
connects is accessible on the internet, 163 which leaves it open to attack from
traditional hackers who target computer systems as opposed to cell phones. 164
The final major concern with MORIS, as with any system or procedure
adopted by police, is the potential for abuse through selective use, or profiling.
Although this concern exists apart from MORIS in particular, 165 the potential
invasion of privacy facilitated by this system calls for a heightened awareness of,
and active prevention against, such abuse.
VIII.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CONCERNS

In considering the most appropriate approach to take to effectively alleviate
the concerns discussed above, it may be appropriate to first determine the
institution that is best suited to undertake such a task. While most scholars
promote the courts as the appropriate protector of Fourth Amendment rights
against encroachment by new technology, 166 others claim that legislatures are
best suited for the job. 167 However, while these bodies may be effective to a
certain extent, in this instance a large portion of the responsibility will fall on
law enforcement and BI 2Technologies
to ensure that the rights of those on whom
68
protected.1
are
used
is
MORIS
As the ultimate users of the technology, police officers are the first line of
defense against abuse of the system. Much of the effort to avoid abuse will need
to be made in ensuring that officers apply existing rules regarding stops and
fingerprinting to the new technology of iris scanners. 69 In order to ensure a
smooth adoption of the technology, police departments and other law
enforcement agencies may want to establish explicit rules regarding the proper
use of MORIS (or similar devices). In addition to ensuring proper procedure in
the use of the iris scanners, police departments will need to be vigilant to avoid
abuse through selective use by officers, especially when additional factors, such
as racial profiling, appear to currently influence arrest rates.

163. See Heaton, supranote 37.
164. For a broad view of the prevalence of hacking, see the U.S. Department of Justice's 2005
report on cybercrime against businesses. RAMONA R. RANTALA, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 221943, CYBERCRIME AGAINST BUSINESSES 1 (2005) (noting that,
among businesses surveyed, 67% detected at least one cybercrime in 2005).
165. See Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at RacialProfiling: Evidence from
the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 177 (2009) ("[R]esults suggest that
preference-based discrimination plays a substantial role in explaining differences in the rate at
which motorists from different racial groups are searched during traffic stops.").
166. Levy, supra note 46, at 501.
167. See Kerr, supra note 45, at 806, 838 ("[W]e should not expect the Fourth Amendment
alone to provide adequate protections against invasions of privacy made possible by law
enforcement use of new technologies."); Levy, supra note 46, at 501.
168. See Levy, supra note 46, at 511-12 (arguing that while law enforcement is best suited to
regulate the use of new technologies, it may not have the incentive needed to adequately do so).
169. See Smith, supra note 3; Albanesius, supra note 135.
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While safeguarding ajainst abuse will primarily be the responsibility of law
enforcement agencies, BI Technologies also bears significant responsibility in
preventing misuse of its technology. In order to ensure the accuracy of iris scans
by MORIS, BI 2Technologies could incorporate an error reporting feature into its
software that would allow officers to note the existence of false matches as they
occur, while still deleting the personal data of those scanned (as they state they
already do).170 In addition to this feature, routine auditing of these error reports,
along with testing of the system by an independent party in a real-world
setting-preferably by a government oversight or privacy advocacy group---is
recommended.
To ensure the security and integrity of data used by MORIS, all information
on iris scans sent to and from the iPhones to which the device is attached should
be encrypted.17 Again, this is a function of BI2 Technologies' software, and as
such the company would bear responsibility for this layer of security. In
addition to encryting the data transmitted, the phones will need to be secured
against hackers." Apart from the safe use of the system in the field, one would
also want to ensure proper storage and oversight of the data collected by
MORIS. Currently, the database of iris scans is maintained by MORIS' s creator,
along with the National Sherriff s Association; 73 however, it would be more
prudent to allow independent monitoring, at least, or full ownership, at most, to
an organization that is better suited to protect the privacy interests of those
whose data is contained in the database. For example, the FBI already maintains
such a database for fingerprints and criminal histories, known as the Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), 174 and currently has plans

for a replacement of IAFIS that will include iris data.' 75 It would be appropriate,
and more efficient in the future, to migrate the existing data that MORIS has
collected into the FBI database and have one location where all iris information
is maintained. In addition to the practical advantages of a single database, giving
the FBI control over the iris information could allow them the ability to audit and
test MORIS, as mentioned above, as well as the ability to ensure that data of
non-criminals is properly deleted after its initial capture. Along with the FBI's
efforts, involving an independent government accountability or privacy
advocacy group would help to prevent data mining.

170. See Smart phone face scan tech a privacy breach?, supra note 38.
171. See generally CFNetwork Programming Guide, APPLE (2011), http://developer.
(describing
apple.conm/library/ios/documentation/Networking/Conceptual/CFNetwork/CFNetwork.pdf
iPhone network encryption protocols).
172. See Murphy, supra note 161.
173. See Heaton, supra note 37.
174. See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/

about-us/cjis/fmgerprints-biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). In fact, MORIS uses that
database for its fingerprint and facial recognition features. See Heaton, supra note 37.
175. See Next Generation Identification, FBI, http:llwww.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints-

biometrics/ngi/ngi-overview (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
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While responsibility for ensuring the proper and safe use of MORIS rests
primarily with its creator (B1 2) and users (law enforcement), there are certain
steps that a legislature could take to further these goals as well. First and
foremost, Congress could pass legislation restricting the use of MORIS without a
warrant.176 It could also pass legislation requiring that the database be handed
over by B12Technologies to the government, that appropriate oversight be given
to an independent group, and that the security features and anti-data mining
efforts outlined above are implemented.
IX. CONCLUSION

While MORIS, at least on first impression, raises significant concerns
among privacy advocates, 77 given the Supreme Court's current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, it appears that its proper use by police is
constitutional. It is possible, especially given the Court's recent apprehension
toward allowing the government unrestricted use of new technologies, that the
Supreme Court could adopt a broad interpretation of reasonableness, and declare
warrantless mobile iris scans to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
However, that holding is not likely. So long as proper steps are taken to ensure
that the technology is accurate, to safeguard the privacy of iris scan subjects, and
to avoid abusive use of the scanners, MORIS (and iris scanning in general) will
likely continue to increase in prevalence, and may one day be considered as
innocuous to the average citizen as current fingerprinting and DNA identification
techniques.
ChristopherR. Jones

176. For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was enacted in part to
restrict the holding of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which stated that the use of pen
registers by phone companies to log one's dialed phone numbers was constitutionally permissible,
id. at 745-46. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1868-71 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
177. See Howard, supra note 54; Smart phone face scan tech a privacy breach?, supra note
38; Smith, supra note 3.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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